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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AS A SYMBOL
OF THE RULE OF LAW
Jenia Iontcheva Turner*

I. INTRODUCTION

T

HROUGHOUT South America, Southern and Eastern Europe,
and East Asia, more than two dozen countries have transitioned to
democracy since the 1980s.1 A remarkable number of these have
adopted an exclusionary rule (mandating that evidence obtained unlawfully by the government is generally inadmissible in criminal trials) as
part of broader legal reforms. Democratizing countries have adopted exclusionary rules even though they are not required to do so by any international treaty and there is no indication that there is widespread popular
demand for such rules. This has occurred at a time when the rule has been
weakened in the United States, the country that is often looked to as a
model on this question.2
What is it about transition to democracy that calls on these countries to
introduce an exclusionary rule? It appears that experience with authoritarian rule has focused the new regimes on the danger of a powerful executive who exercises power arbitrarily. The exclusionary rule is adopted, at
least in part, because it embodies the idea of restraining government
power and promoting the rule of law.
This rule-of-law conception of the exclusionary rule, I would argue, is
broader than the current understanding of the rule in the United States.
Under U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, exclusion is justified only
when it would deter police officers from violating constitutional rights in
the future and when the benefits of deterrence outweigh costs to the enforcement of criminal law.3 Under the rule-of-law conception, by contrast, the exclusionary rule is justified as a means of holding the executive
within the limits of the law and preventing government lawlessness from

* Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. I thank John Turner for helpful
comments and Katherine Blakley, Tom Kimbrough, and Cheyenne Rogers for excellent
research assistance.
1. For graphs illustrating individual countries’ transitions to democracy, see Monty G.
Marshall, Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2013,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
2. See, e.g., TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
302–47 (2013).
3. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2014); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S.
586, 591 (2006).
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becoming rampant.4 In many countries transitioning to democracy, this
concern about arbitrary rule is not just an abstract danger but rather a
recent lived experience. Courts and legislators in these countries have
often opted for strict exclusionary rules, despite the resulting costs on the
enforcement of criminal law. In the United States, where experience with
arbitrary regimes is more attenuated, and where the violent crime rate
remains significant, concerns about enforcing the criminal law weigh
more heavily in the balance.5 It remains to be seen whether some of the
new democracies will over time move toward a weaker form of the exclusionary rule, as demands for law and order likewise press for a balancing
of interests, or whether they will maintain a robust exclusionary rule as a
symbol and instrument of the rule of law.
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD
In the 1980s, more than a dozen countries in Latin America and Southern Europe transitioned from military dictatorships to liberal democracies.6 Another wave of democratization occurred in the 1990s with the fall
of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, authoritarian regimes in East
Asia, and apartheid in South Africa.7 This trend continued through the
early 2000s across parts of Eastern Europe.8 The political and legal reforms in these countries generally aimed to establish modern constitutional democracies, which not only provided for fair elections, but also
constrained the power of governments through mechanisms such as the
separation of powers, checks and balances, individual rights, and the rule
of law.9
Criminal procedure reform was an important element of these transitions to liberal democracy. Constitutions and criminal procedure codes
were amended to provide more robust rights for defendants in the crimi4. Scott E. Sundby, Everyman’s Exclusionary Rule: The Exclusionary Rule and the
Rule of Law (or Why Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclusionary Rule), 10 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 393, 404 (2013); see also Hock Lai Ho, The Criminal Trial, the Rule of Law and
the Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence, CRIM. L. & PHIL. 4 (2014), available at
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11572-014-9304-7 (arguing that the exclusionary rule advances the rule of law by checking the executive in its bid to enforce the criminal law against the defendant).
5. See Crime in the United States 2012, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/
crime-in-the-u.s./2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/violent-crime/violent-crime (last visited Oct.
16, 2014) (follow “Table 1” hyperlink).
6. See Marshall, supra note 1.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., Detlef Nolte & Almut Schilling-Vacaflor, Introduction: The Times They
Are a Changin’: Constitutional Transformations in Latin America Since 1990s, in NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: PROMISE AND PRACTICES 3, 15, 20-22 (Detlef Nolte
& Almut Schilling-Vacaflor eds. 2012); Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 71, 94 (2004); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762,
793-96, 836-50 (2012).
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nal process and to limit government power to prosecute and punish.10
Many of the rights guaranteed as part of the reforms—the right to remain
silent, the right to counsel, and the right to privacy—were included in
international human rights conventions to which the democratizing states
were parties.11 But one particular legal reform, the introduction of an
exclusionary rule for unlawfully obtained evidence, was also broadly implemented, even though it was not mandated by any international human
rights convention.12 Exclusionary rules were adopted by inquisitorial, adversarial, and mixed systems alike, suggesting an appeal that transcends
differences in criminal procedure traditions.13 Strikingly, a number of
these rules were categorical and sweeping, contrary to popular belief
within the United States, including at the U.S. Supreme Court, that “the
automatic exclusionary rule applied in our court is still ‘universally rejected’ by other countries.”14
In Latin America, democratic governments in Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay all adopted relatively broad exclusionary
rules, at least in part as a means of distancing themselves from previous
repressive regimes.15 Argentina’s experience is illustrative. In the 1980s,
10. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Siegelbaum, The Right Amount of Rights: Calibrating Criminal Law and Procedure in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J.
73, 90-96 (2002).
11. Id.; see also Stephen C. Thaman, Balancing Truth Against Human Rights: A Theory of Modern Exclusionary Rules, 20 IUS GENTIUM 403, 405 (2013).
12. For the reluctance of the European Court of Human Rights to mandate exclusionary rules, see, for example, Khan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35394/97, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R.
45, ¶ 34 (2000). Exclusion is required under international law only for evidence obtained
through torture, and under some regional conventions, for evidence obtained through inhumane and degrading treatment or coercion. UN Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 15 (“Each State Party shall
ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture
shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of
torture as evidence that the statement was made.”); American Convention on Human
Rights, art. 8(3) (“A confession of guilt by the accused shall be valid only if it is made
without coercion of any kind.”); Gäfgen v. Germany, 52 E.H.R.R. 1, 42 (2011). For a discussion of the case law by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on excluding coerced confessions, see Federico Morgenstern, “Argumentos a favor de la relativización de
la regla de exclusión de prueba illegal,” in TRATADO DE LOS DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALES *58–59 (forthcoming Abeledo Perrot Pubs 2014) (draft on file with author).
13. See, e.g., Stephen C. Thaman, The Exclusionary Rule, in GENERAL REPORTS OF
THE XVIIITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW
658–59 (Karen B. Brown & David V. Snyder eds. 2012); Mirjan Damas̆ka, Free Proof and
Its Detractors, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 348 (1995); Margaret K. Lewis, Controlling Abuse
To Maintain Control: The Exclusionary Rule in China, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 629,
646–49 (2011); Christopher Slobogin, A Comparative Perspective on the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, in Research Handbook on Comparative Criminal Procedure (Jacqueline Ross & Stephen Thaman eds., forthcoming 2014).
14. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 344 (2006) (quoting Craig Bradley, Mapp
Goes Abroad, 52 CASE RES. L. REV. 375, 399-400 (2001)).
15. CONSTITUCÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 5 (Braz.) (providing that “evidence obtained through unlawful means is inadmissible in the proceedings”) (adopted in
1988, three years after the end of military dictatorship and transition to democracy in Brazil), translated in International Constitutional Law Project Information, at http://www.ser
vat.unibe.ch/icl/br00000_.html; José Luis G. González, La Policı́a en el Estado de Derecho
Latinoamericano: El Caso Uruguay, in LA POLICÍA EN LOS ESTADOS DE DERECHO LATINOAMERICANOS (Kai Ambos et al. eds. 2003), at http://cedpal.uni-goettingen.de/data/inves
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as the reign of Argentina’s military junta dictatorship ended, newly
elected President Raúl Alfonsı́n’s government began a process of democratization.16 This process included the initiation of comprehensive legal
reforms to support constitutional democracy, as well as the replacement
of judges who were seen as complicit with the military dictatorship.17
Reflecting these reforms, the Argentine Supreme Court revived an exclusionary rule as a means of safeguarding judicial independence and the
rule of law. The Court had previously applied an exclusionary rule in
1891,18 but had then abandoned it “without much explanation.”19 In the
1984 Fiorentino case, the Argentine Supreme Court held that the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence is “not only inconsistent with the
rule of law, but . . . is also an impairment to the regular administration of
justice.”20 Since then, the Court has consistently justified the exclusionary
rule on grounds that it helps promote judicial integrity. The Court has
explained that “courts should not allow the state to capitalize on illegal
police conduct”21 because doing so “creates the fundamental contradiction of the legal system validating an illegal act.”22
The interpretation of the exclusionary rule as a means of preserving the
rule of law and judicial integrity has endured until today. It has produced
an exclusionary rule that is in many respects broader than the American
tigacion/grupales/Antiguos/PoliciaKaiAmbos.pdf#page=515 (discussing Uruguayan exclusionary rules); Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems:
The Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 323, 324–25, 355 (1998) (discussing Chile); Marı́a Victoria Rivas, Informe de
Paraguay, Proyecto de Seguimiento de los Procesos de Reforma Judicial en América Latina (Centro de Estudios de Justicia de las Américas 2002) (discussing Paraguay); José
Piscoya Silva, Procedimiento de Exclusión de la Prueba Ilı́cita, 5 DERECHO & CAMBIO
SOCIAL (2005), at http://www.derechoycambiosocial.com/revista005/prueba%20ilicita.htm#
_ftn10 (discussing Peru); Stephen C. Thaman, “Fruits of the Poisonous Tree” in Comparative Law, 16 SW. J. INT’L L. 333, 342, 345–47 (2010) (discussing “absolute” exclusionary
rules in Brazilian Criminal Procedure Code); see also Janeen Kerper, Trial Advocacy Lessons from Latin America, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 91, 99 (2001) (discussing her experience teaching trial advocacy in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and other Latin American countries; and
noting that “Latin Americans, who far too often have experienced brutal excesses of police
power, are careful to preserve some kind of exclusionary rule to preclude the admission of
forced confessions or other evidence obtained ‘in derogation of human rights’”). While
experience with the previous oppressive regimes was a key shaping factor, a host of other
influences were also at play. For an in-depth discussion, see Maximo Langer, Revolution in
Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. 617 (2007).
16. ALEJANDRO D. CARRIÓ, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF ARGENTINA 90-91
(1989).
17. Id.
18. Charles Hermanos, 46 Fallos C.S.N. 36, cited in CARRIÓ, supra note 16, at 130
(justifying the rule “in the name of morality, security, and privacy”).
19. CARRIÓ, supra note 16, at 130.
20. Fiorentino, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion, 306 Fallos 1752 (1985), cited in
CARRIÓ, supra note 16, at 135; see also Rayford, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion,
13/5/1986, cited in AYA GRUBER ET AL., PRACTICAL GLOBAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
UNITED STATES, ARGENTINA, AND THE NETHERLANDS 217 (2012).
21. GRUBER ET AL., supra note 20, at 217.
22. Id. (citing Montenegro, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion, 10/1/2/1981;
Reyford, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion, 13/5/1986).
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rule.23 Some commentators have criticized Argentine courts for retaining
this expansive interpretation, even as the threat of return to arbitrary rule
has subsided.24 With constitutional democracy and respect for individual
rights established, some have argued that Argentine courts ought to balance the benefits of excluding evidence against the interests in truth-seeking and enforcing the criminal law.25 But this remains a minority position,
and the abuses of the past are frequently referenced as a reason why Argentina should retain a categorical approach to exclusion.26
Like Argentina, several Southern European countries—Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey—also adopted or strengthened their exclusionary rules as part of a transition away from military dictatorship and to
constitutional democracy.27 In Spain, courts did not traditionally exclude
evidence as a remedy for police violations of individual rights during the
investigation.28 In 1978, three years after the end of the Francoist regime,
Spain adopted a new constitution that “placed the protection of human
rights at the heart of the constitutional order.”29 The emphasis on due
process in the new constitution led the Spanish Supreme Court to adopt a
broad and categorical exclusionary rule in 1984 in the name of protecting
fundamental rights.30 The following year, this exclusionary rule was codified in Section 11.1 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power.31 These
developments have been expressly characterized as “a reaction to the
23. Id. at 218; see also Alejandro D. Carrió & Alejandro M. Garro, Argentina, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 3, 22–25 (Craig Bradley ed. 2d ed., 2007).
24. Morgenstern, supra note 12, at *1–2.
25. Id. at *2, 17–18.
26. Id. at *14–18, 27–43, 169; see also Alejandro Garro, Nine Years of Transition to
Democracy in Argentina: Partial Failure or Qualified Success?, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1, 42 (1993–1994) (“[I]n a country like Argentina where the balance of interests has
traditionally weighed in favor of governmental power at the expense of individual rights,
affirming the sanctity of the judicial process at this juncture of a transition to democracy,
even at the cost of suppressing unquestionable evidence that could serve to convict a
wrongdoer, would further the rule of law and foster a legal culture tied to procedural
fairness.”).
27. PORTUG. CONST. art. 32(8) (“All evidence obtained by torture, coercion, infringement of personal physical or moral integrity, improper intromission into personal life, the
home, correspondence or telecommunications shall be deemed null and void.”) (adopted
in 1976, two years after the end of military dictatorship and transition to democracy), translation available at http://app.parlamento.pt/site_antigo/ingles/cons_leg/Constitution_VII_re
visao_definitive.pdf; Lorena Bachmaier Winter, Spain: The Constitutional Court’s Move
from Categorical Exclusion to Limited Balancing, 20 IUS GENTIUM 209, 232 (2013); Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, The Exclusion of Improperly Obtained Evidence in Greece: Putting
Constitutional Rights First, 11 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 181, 208 (2007); Adem Sözüer &
Öznur Sevdiren, Turkey: The Move to Categorical Exclusion of Illegally Gathered Evidence, 20 IUS GENTIUM 287, 288 (2013).
28. Winter, supra note 27, at 232 (“Although the 1882 Spanish CCP [Code of Criminal
Procedure] established certain limits on the gathering of evidence, the general practice was
to accept at trial any evidence which could contribute to the determination of the truth of
the facts contained in the accusatory pleadings, regardless of how the evidence was
gathered.”).
29. Id. at 232.
30. Id. at 215, 232.
31. Id. at 215 (citing Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial § 11.1).
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abuses of the Francoist police.”32
Starting in the late 1990s, as the experience of arbitrary rule receded
further into the past, Spanish courts began moving away from the categorical approach in some cases and balancing interests in deciding
whether to exclude evidence.33 But at least the initial unconditional embrace of exclusion appears to have been motivated by Spain’s experiences
with an oppressive regime and a concern for the protection of individual
rights.
Like several other European countries, such as Italy and France,
Greece had a tradition of “nullities,” which considered void evidence obtained as a result of certain procedural violations.34 But nullities applied
to only a few specific violations of the Criminal Procedure Code and not
more broadly to unlawfully obtained evidence.35 Their practical significance was therefore limited.36 More recently, Greece introduced a robust
exclusionary rule in its 1995 Criminal Procedure Code.37 Furthermore,
case law from the 1990s interpreted exclusion as a constitutionally mandated remedy for certain violations, and the 2001 Constitution included
an express provision to that effect.38 The Greek exclusionary rule is automatic and “unusually wide” in its scope.39 Its remarkable breadth has
been linked at least in part to the “bitter, and not-too-distant, experience
of rule by military junta.”40 The rule has also been defended as a means
of vindicating fundamental individual rights.41
In Turkey, the exclusionary rule was adopted during a period of democratization in the 1990s. Turkey had experienced three military coups
in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, respectively, all of which brought instability and human rights violations. After the 1980 military coup, mistreatment of suspects in custody became the subject of “vigorous criticism by
both domestic and international human rights authorities.”42 The Turkish
government took several steps to deflect this criticism. It accepted oversight by the European Court of Human Rights and liberalized the coun32. Thaman, supra note 13, at 441.
33. Id.
34. Georgios Triantafyllou, Greece: From Statutory Nullities to a Categorical Statutory
Exclusionary Rule, 20 IUS GENTIUM 261, 261, 264 (2013) (tracing nullities to the initial
1951 version of the Criminal Procedure Code).
35. Id. at 261, 264–68.
36. The Greek Court of Cassation had also held in 1871 that exclusion was a possible
remedy for certain unconstitutional searches of correspondence, but this holding was narrowly construed and exclusion hardly ever imposed. See Giannoulopoulos, supra note 27,
at 183.
37. Id. at 191.
38. Id. at 195, 198.
39. As Giannoulopoulos explains, the rule applies to: (1) evidence obtained in violation of certain statutes and the Constitution; (2) all stages of criminal proceedings; (3)
direct and derivative evidence; (4) evidence obtained by private actors and evidence obtained by state officials; and (5) cases in which a third party’s rights, not the defendant’s,
were violated. Id. at 207.
40. Id. at 208.
41. Id. at 192, 207–08.
42. Sözüer & Sevdiren, supra note 27, at 288.
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try’s legal framework, emphasizing respect for human rights and the rule
of law.43 In the same vein, it codified an exclusionary rule as a signal to
the international community that Turkey was taking measures to restrain
police abuses.44 The rule was subsequently linked to constitutional provisions affirming judicial review and the rule of law.45 Despite some calls
for a more balanced approach to exclusion, Turkish courts have so far
applied a strict automatic rule on the grounds that it is more consistent
with the rule of law and the protection of constitutional rights.46
Like their Southern European neighbors, Eastern European countries
such as Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Serbia have also introduced exclusionary rules during democratic
reforms over the last two decades.47 As elsewhere, this occurred as part
of broader criminal procedure reforms aimed to strengthen individual
rights and the rule of law. It was both a symbol of a break with the past
and a legal tool intended to solidify the protection of individual rights and
the rule of law. Not surprisingly, many of the rules adopted were, at least
initially, quite strict and broad.48
The introduction of the exclusionary rule in Russia illustrates this approach. The 1993 Russian Constitution provided for the inadmissibility of
unlawfully obtained evidence, and the 2002 Code of Criminal Procedure
included a categorical exclusionary rule.49 The rule’s adoption was part of
a sweeping overhaul of the Russian criminal justice system, aiming to
strengthen individual rights and subject government officials to the rule
43. Id. at 288–89.
44. Id.; see also A. Vahit Bicak, A Comparative Study of the Problem of the Admissibility of Improperly Obtained Evidence, PhD Dissertation, University of Nottingham
116–18 (1995), available at http://etheses.nottingham.ac.uk/2354.
45. Sözüer & Sevdiren, supra note 27, at 289.
46. Id. at 291, 291 n.17.
47. BULG. CRIM. PROC. CODE § 105(2) (“No objective forms of evidence shall be admitted, unless they have been collected or prepared in compliance with the terms and
pursuant to the procedure herein specified.”) (English translation available at http://www
.vks.bg/english/vksen_p04_03.htm#Chapter_eleven__); Bela Busch et al., Criminal Law, the
Law of Criminal Procedure, and the Law of Corrections in Hungary, in LEGAL REFORM IN
POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE: THE VIEW FROM WITHIN 233, 244, 251 (Stanisław Frankowski
& Paul B. Stephan III eds., 1995); Zeljko Karas, Exclusion of Illegal Police Evidence in
Croatia, 8 VARSTVOSLOVJE 283, 284 (2006); Bogdan Florin Micu, Procedural Implications
of the Illegal Administration of Evidence During a Criminal Trial, LEX & SCIENTIA INT’L J.
(2012), available at http://www.ceeol.com (discussing Romania’s exclusionary rule);
Snežana Brkić, Serbia: Courts Struggle with a New Categorical Statutory Exclusionary Rule,
20 IUS GENTIUM 309 (2013); The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control,
National Criminal Justice Profiles: Czech Republic 9, 35 (2002), at http://www.heuni.fi/en/in
dex/publications/nationalcriminaljusticeprofiles/czechrepublic.html (discussing the Czech
rule).
48. This was the case at least in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Russia, and Serbia. BULG.
CRIM. PROC. CODE § 105(2); Busch et al., supra note 47, at 251; Karas, supra note 47, at
284; Brkić, supra note 47, at 309; Stephen C. Thaman, Constitutional Rights in the Balance:
Modern Exclusionary Rules and the Toleration of Police Lawlessness in the Search for
Truth, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 691, 704 (2011).
49. Thaman, supra note 48, at 704 (citing KONSTITUSIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII
[KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 50(2) (Russ.)) (“In the administration of justice the use
of evidence gathered in violation of federal law is not permitted.”).
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of law.50
The extent of the rule’s enforcement in Russia remains unclear. Some
commentators have suggested that “in general, Russian judges are suppressing evidence obtained via illegal searches and seizures in both the
first instance and on appeal.”51 While suppression rates in 30–70% of jury
trial cases have been reported, the effects of suppression have often been
short-lived.52 The Russian Supreme Court has reversed a number of acquittals by the juries “on the grounds that the trial judge had purportedly
violated the rights of the prosecution by unlawfully excluding the evidence.”53 Moreover, maltreatment and coerced confessions in detention
reportedly continue, suggesting that exclusion has not fully transformed
police practices in Russia.54 The feeble enforcement of the rule has, at
least for the present time, undercut its power as a symbol of the rule of
law.
A few Asian countries, including Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, and
Thailand, have likewise adopted exclusion as part of broader transitions
to constitutional democracy.55 In Taiwan, the judiciary introduced an exclusionary rule in 1998, which was subsequently codified by the legislature as part of a broader effort to break with the legacy of a decade-long
authoritarian regime. As Maggie Lewis notes, “the exclusionary rule in
Taiwan came about at a time that the new government was distancing
itself from the previous government’s perceived abuse of power. . . . [T]he
post-martial-law government made a definitive statement that ‘we are not
50. Leonard Orland, A Russian Legal Revolution: The 2002 Criminal Procedure Code,
18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 133, 133 (2002) (“Russia’s new Code of Criminal Procedure is remarkable given Russia’s long history of the use of criminal law as the primary instrument of
oppression, a condition freely acknowledged by the current reformers.”); see also id. at
151–52 (“Russia is in need of bringing the constitutional rule of law to bear on police
abuses. . . Russia has made some progress in this area. Russia’s Constitutional and Code
provisions create an exclusionary rule, a Miranda type warning system and rudiments of a
right to counsel during interrogation.”); id. at 152–53 (“Russia’s long history and ongoing
practice of police abuse of criminal suspects coupled with the ghastly conditions of pre-trial
confinement make imperative the need for a broader and sharper instrument for dealing
with police misconduct.”).
51. Catherine Newcombe, Russia, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY
397, 432 (Craig Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007).
52. See id.
53. Stephen C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 581, 606
(2001).
54. E.g., Lewis, supra note 13, at 647; Newcombe, supra note 51, at 437 (noting that
various factors, including the low quality of defense counsel, explain why the Code’s guarantees are not being fully realized); William Burnham & Jeffrey Kahn, Russia’s Criminal
Procedure Code Five Years Out, 33 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 1, 55–57 (2008) (noting the
difficulties of effectively “excluding” evidence in non-jury trials in Russia, given the continued use of the dossier system).
55. Kuk Cho, The 2007 Revision of the Korean Criminal Procedure Code, 8 J. KOREAN
L. 1, 17 (2008); Lewis, supra note 13, at 648 (discussing Taiwan); Robert R. Strang, “More
Adversarial, but Not Completely Adversarial:” Reformasi of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 188, 217, 221 (2008); Siriphon Kusonsinwut, A Comparative Study of Confession Law: The Lesson for Thailand Regarding the Exclusionary Rule
and Confession Admissibility Standard (unpublished J.S.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois Law School) (on file with University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign).
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them.’”56
This cursory overview of the recent wave of exclusionary rule adoptions suggests that these rules are commonly introduced as part of modern criminal procedure reforms during transitions to democracy. They are
frequently justified in terms broader than the need to discipline police
forces and are used to signal a commitment to the rule of law and individual rights. In countries where the law (particularly criminal law) had been
used as a means to repress dissent and where government officials had
been perceived to be outside the reach of the law, the exclusionary rule is
a powerful symbol of a new beginning. It is seen as a sign that courts will
enforce the law impartially to citizens and government agents alike and
will protect individual rights in the criminal process.
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE RULE OF LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES
Ironically, the exclusionary rule is spreading globally at the same time
that it is on the retreat in the United States. Over the last fifty years, the
U.S. Supreme Court has continually restricted the scope of the rule and
rejected the notion that exclusion can be justified on the grounds that it
protects individual rights or judicial integrity.57 Under current doctrine,
exclusion should be imposed only when it deters police misconduct and
when its benefits (deterring constitutional violations) outweigh its social
costs (hindering the search for truth and the effective enforcement of
criminal law).58
Looking back in time, one sees a more “majestic” conception of the
U.S. exclusionary rule, focused on the protection of constitutional rights
and the integrity of the judicial system.59 This view of the rule was prominent from the late nineteenth century, when the Court decided Boyd v.
United States,60 to the early 1960s, when the Court applied the rule to the
states in Mapp v. Ohio.61 The Court’s decisions of that era emphasized
the critical role of the exclusionary rule in giving meaning to constitutional rights. Without exclusion, provisions that protect rights guaranteed
in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments would be reduced to “a form
56. Lewis, supra note 13, at 648; see also Yu-Jie Chen, One Problem, Two Paths: A
Taiwanese Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule in China, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 713,
719–20 (2011) (noting that the Taiwanese judiciary adopted the exclusionary rule in an
effort to assert its independence and to gain legitimacy by protecting human rights).
57. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“[T]he exclusionary
rule is not an individual right and applies only where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’”) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)); Sundby, supra note 4,
at 395–96.
58. Herring, 555 U.S. at 141; Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
59. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although this
conception of the rule has been abandoned at the federal level, it persists in a number of
state jurisdictions. See Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, ‘‘A More Majestic Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 47, 47–49 (2010).
60. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
61. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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of words”62 such that they “might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.”63
This early conception also viewed the exclusionary rule as a central
element in protecting judicial integrity and the rule of law. Although definitions of the rule of law vary, at the core of the concept is the idea that
“the state and its officials are limited by law” and that the law applies to
government officials in the same way that it does to everyone else.64 As
originally conceived, the exclusionary rule advances the rule of law in
several ways. First, when courts exclude evidence, they restrain the executive to investigate and prosecute within the limits of the law. The rule is
therefore part of the system of checks and balances that helps stop government lawlessness in its tracks and prevents degeneration into arbitrary
rule.65 As the Supreme Court reasoned in Mapp v. Ohio, “[n]othing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.”66 The
exclusionary rule stands in the way of such destruction and protects the
ideal of a republic of laws rather than of men.67
The exclusionary rule also bolsters the rule of law through the message
it conveys to the public—that the Constitution applies equally to government agents and citizens and that “those who use the law in their exercise
of power [are also made] subject to it.”68 Over the long term, the rule
arguably protects judicial integrity by showing that courts will condemn
official lawlessness when it occurs.69 Finally, by demonstrating that government agents will be held accountable for violations of the law, even
62. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
63. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
64. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY 91, 113-14 (2004) (discussing various formal and substantive theories of the rule of
law).
65. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (“The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the
State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of
the people rest.”); see also Ex parte Turner, 792 So. 2d 1141, 1151 (Ala. 2000) (emphasizing
that suppression of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional mandates is necessary
“to preserve the rule of law itself”); Sundby, supra note 4, at 404.
66. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously.”); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]t [is] a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble
part.”).
67. Sundby, supra note 4, at 399.
68. Ho, supra note 4, at n.53 (quoting Gerald J. Postema, Law’s Rule: Reflexivity,
Mutual Accountability, and the Rule of Law, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2294632); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); People
v. Goldston, 682 N.W.2d 479, 504 (Mich. 2004) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (“I believe our
citizens expect the government to follow the law, just as they are required to do. . . . [L]aw
enforcement officers are not given a free pass merely because they are cloaked with governmental authority.”).
69. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960)) (“When judges appear to become
‘accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold,’ we
imperil the very foundation of our people’s trust in their Government on which our democ-
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when this imposes serious costs, courts teach citizens about the importance of following the law. Justice Brandeis emphasized this educational
function of the exclusionary rule in his dissent in Olmstead v. United
States: “Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.”70
An important critique of this conception of the exclusionary rule is that
letting guilty criminals go free also undermines the rule of law.71 Citizens,
too, must obey the law, and when no consequences are imposed on those
who have committed a crime, this also impairs the integrity of the justice
system.
While this is true, it can be argued that lawlessness by the government
is uniquely worrisome. When a person is released because of the exclusionary rule, this is done according to clear and preexisting rules and a
reasoned decision by a court. Such decisions are still constrained by the
law and are therefore relatively rare and predictable. By contrast, when
government agents are not held accountable for violations of the law, this
opens the door to the exercise of arbitrary discretion by the executive,
not constrained by reasons, precedent, or preexisting rules. Executive discretion—when unconstrained by law—is easily subject to abuse, often on
a grander scale than violations of the law by private individuals. It is
therefore more injurious to the rule of law than an exclusionary rule that
hinders the state’s inability to convict guilty defendants only in cases
where a court concludes, in a reasoned decision bound by precedent, that
key evidence was obtained unlawfully.
IV. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE STRONG
RULE-OF-LAW CONCEPTION
The embrace of the exclusionary rule by democratizing countries as a
symbol of the rule of law is striking. It has occurred in states with diverse
criminal procedure traditions and in the absence of any mandate by international human rights law. It has happened despite the rule’s potential
unpopularity and tension with majoritarianism. And it has come at the
same time that the exclusionary rule has been weakened in the United
States.72
To understand these developments, it is helpful to understand two aspects of the rule of law, which come into conflict with one another when
courts consider whether to exclude evidence. On the one hand, the rule
racy rests.”); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 484–85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); State v. Handy, 18
A.3d 179, 182 (N.J. 2011).
70. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
71. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 792–93 (1994); Morgenstern, supra note 12, at 61.
72. See MACLIN, supra note 2, at 303–11.
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of law requires individuals to abide by the law. When individuals break
the law, the legal system imposes consequences for the breach; if the
breach is sufficiently serious, the consequences may include criminal
sanctions. On the other hand, in a rule-of-law state, the government must
also follow the law. When government agents violate the law in obtaining
evidence for a criminal prosecution, they must suffer consequences just as
ordinary citizens do. Exclusion is a common sanction for such violations
because it is regarded by many as the most effective means to ensure
compliance and the most direct way to convey to the public that government lawlessness will be restrained and punished. While the exclusionary
rule advances these latter, broader rule-of-law values, it often does so at
the expense of the effective enforcement of the criminal law against the
defendant. When exclusion results in the acquittal of guilty persons, this
contravenes the first requirement of the rule of law—that all citizens
must be held accountable for violating the law.
Under the cost-benefit model currently used in the United States,
courts are increasingly sensitive to the burdens that exclusion imposes on
the enforcement of criminal law.73 These weigh against the need to deter
police misconduct. This is especially the case when the deterrent benefits
are arguably lower—when officers are merely negligent or when they are
acting in good faith and relying on acts by other government agents that
are subsequently found to be unlawful.74
Under the strong rule-of-law conception, which was originally used to
justify the exclusionary rule in the United States and is now popular in
new democracies, the danger from government illegality is seen as a
much more serious threat and as a potential precursor to widespread arbitrary rule. As noted earlier, when courts release a defendant on account
of the exclusionary rule, this is a limited, regulated, and reasoned affair.
The costs to the rule of law are therefore arguably small and contained.
By contrast, when courts fail to constrain lawlessness by the executive,
this leaves virtually boundless discretion to government agents and can
result in serious abuses of individual rights. Particularly when arbitrary
rule is a fact of recent history, as it is for many democratizing countries
that have adopted the rule-of-law model of exclusion, courts and legislators are likely to take more seriously the need to restrain government
illegality. It is therefore not surprising that we see a number of democratizing states adopting broad and categorical exclusionary rules.
V. CONCLUSION
A host of new democracies around the world have embraced the exclusionary rule since the 1980s. Countries have adopted the rule not because
they are required by international law or because the rule is popular. An
important reason for the strong appeal of the exclusionary rule is that it
73. See supra notes 2, 57, 58 and accompanying text.
74. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 141 (2009).
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symbolizes the rule of law and is seen as an effective mechanism to restrain executive power in criminal prosecutions. In countries with a recent
history of powerful and abusive executives, a strong rule-of-law vision of
the exclusionary rule reflects lived experience.
The question for the future is whether the rule-of-law conception of the
exclusionary rule will remain robust in these new democracies. In Spain,
as the abuses of the Francoist regime have receded further into the past,
courts have become more open to balancing competing interests in deciding whether to exclude evidence.75 Some commentators have argued that
Argentine courts should do the same, as Argentina’s democracy has solidified and the return to an oppressive regime appears unlikely.76 These
examples suggest that in at least some of the new democracies, as the
memories of arbitrary rule fade and concerns about crime become more
prominent, courts may become more open to balancing interests in applying the exclusionary rule.
One might also ask the question in reverse: might the adoption of categorical exclusionary rules in new democracies encourage more established democracies, such as the United States, to consider rule-of-law
concerns more carefully in their application of the exclusionary rule? A
strong rule-of-law approach might, for example, cause U.S. courts to
change their approach to “good faith” violations by law enforcement officers. Where an officer relies in good faith on the action of another government agent—be it a magistrate, a legislator, a court clerk, or another
police department employee—the deterrence-oriented, cost-benefit approach views exclusion as unwarranted.77 Under a rule-of-law approach,
by contrast, cases like these implicate lawlessness by a government actor
that must be restrained.
Such a fundamental change in American legal doctrine, however, appears unlikely in the foreseeable future. As our experience with widespread government lawlessness remains distant, and our crime rates
remain high, the interest in enforcing criminal law weighs more heavily in
the balance than the more abstract concern about promoting the rule of
law. In established democracies like the United States, just as in emerging
ones, historical experiences and political circumstances help shape the exclusionary rule and its connection to the rule of law.

75. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
77. Leon, 468 U.S. at 897; Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987); Arizona v. Evans,
514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995); Herring, 555 U.S. at 141.

